Russia’s Army Is Running Out Of Ammunition

• Russia’s army appears to be running on fumes as it struggles to maintain munition stocks.
• Overall. critical logistical difficulties continue to plague the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur railways, making ammunition imports increasingly difficult.
• Arms deliveries from Iran to Russia have been much more stable than from any other source.

In the ninth month of Russia’s war against Ukraine, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the Russian army is being gradually overtaken by “shell hunger.” This should be expected based on earlier analyzes made in August 2022 (see EDM, August 16, 18) and has been partly confirmed by Estonian intelligence data (Err.ee, November 25), as well as analysis from the United States regarding Moscow’s purchase of artillery ammunition from North Korea (Aa.com, November 11).

Overall. critical logistical difficulties continue to plague the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur railways. Thus, we can observe an exhaustion in capacity due to the redirection of supply flows eastward, which is leading to serious economic problems (RBC, November 2). Therefore, we should not exhaust ourselves discussing the possibility of a steady flow of ammunition from North Korea.

Meanwhile, arms deliveries from Iran to Russia have been much more stable than from any other source. In addition to the Shahed-136 drones, we can observe Russian soldiers using other pieces of Iranian equipment on the battlefield (T.me/TyskNIP, November 18). With Moscow granting access for Iranian ships to pass through the Volga-Don Canal, we should expect an increase in the supply of Iranian-made ammunition to the Russian side (see EDM, November 14).

At the same time, Belarus is actively considering the possibility of debugging the production of components for 152-millimeter (mm) and 122-mm caliber shells on its territory and switching to a closed cycle of ammunition production in the future. However, the possibility of organizing such a massive technological process for collecting 122-mm, 220-mm and 300-mm caliber rockets from imported components still needs some clarification.

In this regard, from November 20 to 23. a Belarusian delegation visited Iran for a discussion on future cooperation, primarily in defense production. The list of issues discussed with the Iranian side included talks on the defense industry’s entire production cycle—touching on everything from the technology of steel smelting for ammunition components to the coloring of shells and containers used in their packaging (T.me/DIUkraine, November 17).

The growing Belarusian-Russian military-industrial complex has also put the Byelorussian Steel Works and other Belarusian enterprises in difficult positions with the proliferation of orders related to military products. These tasks were received through the Belarusian Ministry of Industry, but curators from the Ministry of Defense have been appointed to oversee these enterprises. As such, Minsk designated:

• Mogilev Metallurgical Works for establishing the production of reinforced cardan shafts with strong mine protection;
• BSW Research Center (BSW) for testing the steel for armor plates and creating sample armor plates for equipment and the production of bulletproof vests;
• Minsk Bearing Plant for expanding the brands of high-loaded bearings;
• BSW for creating guides for Grad launchers and barrels for mortars.

BSW has also been appointed as primarily responsible for arranging the production of guides for the Uragan 220-mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Here, however, a serious conflict arises: BSW can handle a maximum diameter of 200 mm, and the Ministry of Defense has asked for a 220-mm pipe. Thus, BSW does not have the technical capacity to fulfill this order, but the task remains unconditionally set for BSW nonetheless (T.me/nicolai_khalezin, November 16).

These arrangements highlight the dire nature of Russia’s munition stocks, which have been difficult to accurately trace since 2014. Following 2014, all annual data on ammunition stocks in Russia has been greatly inflated. Therefore, it would be naive to look for information on the volume of their production in the public domain. Nevertheless, some assumptions can be made based on the financial data of the defense industry enterprises that produce certain munitions and special chemicals. Recently, this data was classified by Moscow, but we can still find...

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